Over the last decade, financial economists have grown increasingly circumspect about the practical meaning of market efficiency due to the so-called joint hypothesis problem. In law, however, the concept has taken on an increasingly prominent role, meaning that the need for an operational definition cannot wait. We examine the meaning of market efficiency in contingent claims markets, where existing legal criteria are inappropriate. We propose a practical and economically meaningful test of efficiency applicable to such markets. The test is shown to be immune both to the joint hypothesis problem and to misspecification of the derivatives pricing model. We illustrate application of the test to an important recent case involving credit-linked notes.
Introduction
This paper is concerned with the meaning of market efficiency in the context of markets for derivative securities. These markets constitute a large and growing fraction of all financial assets, and are increasingly used, in one guise or another, by investors at large. Addressing this topic has important legal and regulatory ramifications. And yet it is not straightforward, for both practical and theoretical reasons.
The theory of market efficiency has long been a mainstay of the business school curriculum. For decades, finance professors around the world have repeated the definition that in efficient capital markets asset prices accurately incorporate all publicly available information. In reality, however, the prevalence of market efficiency is much less certain. Starting in the 1980s, financial economists began documenting empirical challenges to the idea, and, since then, both the validity and consequence of these "anomalies" have been the subject of intense academic debate. While each side of the debate has received considerable attention, the logical futility of the argument often goes unmentioned. Specifically, it is an inescapable fact that any test of market efficiency must jointly test a model of how prices should behave. Known as the joint hypothesis problem, this conundrum effectively precludes any verdict on market efficiency until an accepted model of expected returns has been determined. At present, this seems a remote possibility.
Paradoxically, while the joint hypothesis problem has caused economists to grow increasingly circumspect about the practical meaning of market efficiency, the concept has taken on an increasingly prominent role in the legal realm. Some examples include: securities litigation, where market efficiency has been accepted as a sufficient condition for both investor reliance on fraudulent misinformation and the quantification of damages; trust law, where "total return damages" awarded to trust beneficiaries for improper investments are calculated with reference to how an efficiently-priced portfolio would have performed 1 ; intellectual property and contract law, where monetary damages are routinely calculated by discounting lost profits at a company's cost of capital (presupposing efficiently-priced securities); the Securities and Exchange Commission's integrated disclosure system, which allows companies to file simplified registration statements (Form S-3) for securities traded in markets deemed efficient; and the 1994 Uniform Prudent Investor Act, which presupposes market efficiency in allowing fiduciaries utilize modern portfolio theory to guide investment decisions. As billions of dollars in investor damages, corporate lost profits, and fiduciary liability currently hinge on the legal determination of market efficiency, an operational definition cannot wait, even in the face of academic uncertainty.
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In Cammer v. Bloom (1989) , the court established a precedent framework for the assessment of stock market efficiency. Based on this framework, thousands of lawyers and expert witnesses have opined on the market efficiency of various stocks. Though predicated on sound logic, the Cammer methodology only offers qualitative guidelines for the characteristics indicative of efficiently traded stocks (as described in detail in Section 2). However, whatever these rules of thumb lack in theoretical underpinning, their efficacy in assessing at least relative stock market efficiency on average is difficult to dispute, given the number of decisions that have weighed the Cammer methodology over the years. The fact that the Cammer methodology has stood the test of time points favorably to its ability to convey some relevant information to the courts.
While the practical utility of the Cammer methodology in assessing the market effi-ciency of stocks may not be in question, its applicability to contingent claims markets (i.e. derivative securities, including corporate bonds) very much is. Specifically, most financial metrics utilized by the Cammer methodology are simply lacking for derivative securities, which are rarely traded on central exchanges that compile such statistics. Given the lack of data for most contingent claims markets, a literal implementation of the Cammer methodology is infeasible. Thus, courts of law currently lack any quantitative method for assessing the market efficiency of this increasingly utilized class of financial assets.
We propose a definition of efficiency for contingent claims markets which is is both economically appealing and straightforward to assess via a workable test. Specifically, our approach takes a step back from theoretical models and instead defines efficiency by the condition that there be some mapping from the prices of the underlying assets to the derivative price, without requiring that it be completely agreed upon. This condition suggests a natural regression-based test. Compellingly, the test is immune both to the problem of determining efficiency of the underlying primary securities, and to the equally difficult problem of specifying the correct derivatives pricing model. We highlight the main potential difficulties that we envision arising in applications, suggest what to do about them, and provide an example application. We contend that, in the absence of the true model of expected returns, our test provides a sound framework for the legal assessment of market efficiency for contingent claims.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the economic debate on market efficiency, highlighting the economic ramifications of the joint hypothesis problem. Section 3 reviews the legal debate on market efficiency, analyzing how courts assess the relative stock market efficiency for the purposes of securities litigation. Section 4 presents both a theoretical and an operational framework for testing market efficiency in contingent claims markets. In section 5, we successfully apply our test to an important recent case involving credit-linked notes. The final section summarizes the project and concludes.
The Economic Debate on Market Efficiency
In 1970, Eugene Fama defined an efficient financial market as one "in which prices always fully reflect available information." Since these words, both the concept and prevalence of market efficiency have been hotly contested in the academic community. This section reviews he salient features of that debate, and describes the general problems encountered with trying to decide whether a given market is efficient in Fama's sense.
Efficient Markets Hypothesis -Foundations
The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) posits that since rational investors value securities by their fundamental worth (i.e. the net present value of all future dividends, discounted at a rate appropriate to the true risk of the cash-flows), when relevant information about a company is revealed price reaction should happen almost instantly. In addition, the EMH requires prices to react "correctly" to new information, that is, by exactly the change in the discounted value of future dividends as a result of the news. While both assertions seem straightforward, each relies on an implicit notion of how expectations ought to translate into prices. Over the last three decades, economists have come to appreciate how crucial this unstated part of the hypothesis is.
The theoretical foundations of the EMH were formed by the work of Samuelson (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966) , which established that in competitive, frictionless markets with rational, risk-neutral investors, returns are unpredictable. The underlying logic is that investors have access to all available information, so the only thing that can change prices is news. Since predicting what will be (truly) news tomorrow is impossible, stock returns should then follow a random walk.
Subsequent work generalized this conclusion. Risk-neutrality is clearly not necessary, for example. Instead, the benchmark for economists at the time was the the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) under which the implications of the EMH are unchanged. Only the specification of the discount rate is altered.
More subtly, in a world of both rational and irrational investors, the unpredictability of stock prices is not obvious. However, as Friedman (1953) and Fama (1965) point out, arbitrage opportunities exist when stock prices (or exchange rates in Friedman's case) diverge from fundamental values. If perfect or near-perfect substitutes for a given stock exist, then rational investors will buy the cheap security and sell the expensive one until prices equilibrate at fundamental values once again. In doing so, the rational investor makes a (near) risk-free arbitrage profit while bringing the market back into equilibrium. All it takes is a few smart investors to correct the mispricing caused by any number of irrational investors. The argument goes even further, stating that competition erases such arbitrage opportunities almost instantaneously. Prices will never be allowed to stray very much from fundamental values, and superior risk-adjusted returns will be limited even to rational investors. Whether irrational trades are correlated or not, arbitrage keeps prices at or near fundamental values, and the EMH remains a viable depiction of reality.
Early empirical work was largely supportive of the EMH. The premise that superior risk-adjusted returns were unachievable was bolstered by tests of the CAPM. Jensen (1968) documented the inability of actively managed mutual funds to beat the market. Fama and MacBeth (1973) found no predictive power for stock returns based on firmspecific characteristics.
The requirement that prices react fully to news was borne out by numerous event studies.
3 Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) , for example, documented a positive contemporaneous response to stock splits; Keown and Pinkerton (1981) showed that the price of targets of takeover bids jump on the date of public announcement as a reflection of the takeover premium offered. Most importantly, such studies generally showed that excess returns went away after the informational event, indicating that the stock price reflected the new information. Conversely, Scholes (1972) found that stock prices react very little to non-information.
Throughout the 1970s and much of the 1980s, the EMH was not as much of a hypothesis as it was an accepted paradigm. The evidence pointed convincingly to the efficiency of all markets for which data was readily available.
Challenges to the EMH
Starting in the 1980s, empirical studies began documenting apparently significant deviations from market efficiency. The assault on the EMH came in the form of evidence of superior risk-adjusted returns attainable through investment strategies based on publicly available information Banz (1981) found that the returns of portfolios formed by market capitalization cannot be fully explained by differences in risk ("beta") as dictated by the CAPM. Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) showed that stocks with high book-to-market ratios tend to overperform relative to stocks with low book-to-market ratios. Once again, the observed differences remained unexplained after controlling for risk.
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) found that portfolios of long-run losers (stocks which had relatively poor returns over the previous three years) tend to outperform long-run winners (stocks which had relatively good returns over the same period), and that the difference in these returns is left unexplained after controlling for risk; a phenomenon known as long-run reversal in stock prices. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) reported that portfolios of short-run (i.e over the previous six to twelve months) winners tend to have high returns over the subsequent three to six months, while short-run losers tend to have low returns over the same period. This phenomenon, known as price momentum, also cannot be explained after controlling for risk using the CAPM.
Studies of price reaction, too, began to compile evidence of incomplete incorporation of information. Bernard and Thomas (1989) documented long-term drift following the release of surprising earnings news. Travlos (1987) found that acquiror's stocks drifted downward predictably following successful takeovers. Conversely, Roll (1988) concluded that most of the variability in stock prices was not due to public news, and hence that stock prices must be reacting to non-information.
These findings and many others in a similar vein were accompanied by theoretical work (such as DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) , Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ) casting doubt on the presumption that the effect of irrational investors would be arbitraged away. Together, the theory and evidence gave rise to the sub-discipline of "behavioral finance", whose starting point was that the EMH -as a hypothesis -had been disproven.
Rational Return Predictability
At first sight, the possibility of predicting future returns based on either past returns or publicly available financial metrics certainly seems to imply market inefficiency. Yet such an interpretation is, itself, predicated on the assumption that observed returns have been properly adjusted for risk. In the last decade, researchers have increasingly recognized that, in fact, return predictability need not be inconsistent with market efficiency -once the notion of risk has been broadened beyond that prescribed by the CAPM.
With this possibility established, the EMH has witnessed something of a comeback. From the EMH perspective, if anomalous returns are observed, it may not be that the market is inefficient, but rather that the model of expected returns is flawed. Accordingly, much of the recent asset pricing literature has attempted to tie the seemingly anomalous return predictability observed by empirical research to different specifications of risks and risk premia.
In a seminal paper, Fama and French (1996) argue the case for additional risk premia by proposing a three factor model of asset returns (a market factor, a size factor, and a book-to-market factor), stating that the additional factors proxy for other state variables yet to be discovered. Even though the exact theory is unknown, they posit that these three factors are a combination of multifactor mean variance efficient portfolios that has the same explanatory power as the true specification of risks. Empirically, the three factor model of expected returns does an excellent job capturing long-run reversals, the size effect, and the book-to-market effect.
While the three factor model fails to explicitly tie its "factors" to economic sources of risk, macroeconomic models have suggested a variety of possibilities, from human capital to housing. At the same time, the notion of how risks are perceived has been generalized from simple models of expected utility to encompass other -still rationalforms of preferences, such as ones based on relative (or "habit" ) levels of wealth. These models, for example Campbell and Cochrane (1999) , often naturally imply predictability in returns via predictable variation in investors' attitude towards risk.
Another line of research has pursued more complex depictions of the the evolution of risks within firms as a function of their cash-flow process. Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) relate the risk exposure of firms to their portfolio of growth options and investment opportunities. Under their depiction, firms are naturally more risky at times when they are small and when their book-to-market ratio is high. Similarly, Johnson (2002) raises the possibility that firms' dividend growth rate risk varies over time and that investors want to hedge this risk. The resulting dynamic explains momentum effects in stock returns because winner stocks are more risky than losers in being exposed to more growth rate risk. Brennan, Wang, and Xia (2004) relate the riskiness of cash-flows to their duration, and show that, combined with time-varying investment opportunities, this results in a rich cross-section of asset returns.
The success of these efforts in resuscitating the EMH has hardly been complete however. In effect, the message has been that more complicated (and realistic) models of risk and preferences may explain many of the return patterns that seem inefficient from a naive standpoint. This is far from a positive demonstration, though, that the naive standpoint -which takes anomalously high or low returns as evidence of inefficient mispricing until proven otherwise -is not actually the right one. 
The Joint Hypothesis Problem
To summarize, then, the concept of market efficiency, once one of the central pillars of financial theory, is today regarded as highly problematic -and perhaps not even welldefined -by most economists. The source of this problem was highlighted by Fama himself in 1970:
The definitional statement that, in an efficient market, prices "fully reflect" available information is so general that it has no empirically testable implications. To make the [EMH] testable, the process of price formation must be specified in more detail. In essence we must define somewhat more exactly what is meant by the term "fully reflect."
In other words, in order to decide on the efficiency of a given market, we must already have in place an agreed theory of how to properly discount uncertain cash-flows -i.e. an accepted asset pricing model. And then any test of market efficiency is actually a simultaneous test of the validity of that model. This has come to be known as the joint hypothesis problem.
So far, there is no such accepted pricing model. Despite recent advances, a definitive successor to the CAPM has yet to emerge. Yet without one, the flood of reported anomalies in the empirical finance literature can still not be conclusively regarded as disproving efficiency in Fama's sense. To many observers, this state of affairs effectively renders the EMH an untestable, and hence empty, proposition.
Market Efficiency in Securities Litigation
As the last section described, the joint hypothesis problem precludes any proof or disproof of the EMH both now and in the foreseeable future. Despite this, much of the current legal and regulatory regime in the U.S. relies quite heavily on the demonstrable existence of efficiently priced securities
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, and nowhere has the effect of market efficiency on legal precedent been more pervasive than in the domain of securities litigation. This section analyzes both the role of market efficiency in such cases and how courts have come to assess stock market efficiency.
In the U.S., the adjudicatory framework for securities litigation under Rule 10b-5 requires the investor/plaintiff to have detrimentally relied on the defendant's material factual misstatements or omissions. In Basic v. Levinson (1988) , the US Supreme Court accepted a "fraud-on-the-market theory" in lieu of proof of reliance. As adopted in Basic, the fraud on the market theory applies to open and efficient markets, and creates a presumption that:
An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.
In other words, misstatements harm the investor/plaintiff even one who was unaware of them -by inflating the market price of securities. Therefore, if the market for the security in question was open and efficient, then plaintiffs do not have to prove how each was individually misled. They just have to point to the fact that they purchased an efficiently-priced security as justification for their collective claim.
On the other hand, defendants may rebut the presumption of reliance by showing that the security's price would not necessarily have reflected the misrepresented (or wrongly undisclosed) information. In other words, by proving the market in question was inefficient, defendants can preempt class certification and force plaintiffs to seek damages on an individual basis. As per-trial legal costs would typically negate any damages awarded for the vast majority of plaintiffs, such an outcome has the potential to save millions if not billions of dollars for defendants.
Thus there is obvious incentive for both sides to either prove or disprove market efficiency. But how exactly do courts decide? In Cammer v. Bloom (1989) , the court identified five factors relevant to the determination of stock market efficiency:
1. Stock's average trading volume: "A large weekly volume of stock trades suggests significant investor interest in the company. Such interest ... implies a likelihood that many investors are executing trades on the basis of newly available or disseminated corporate information.
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2. Number of securities analysts: "The more securities analysts who follow and report on a company's stock, the greater the likelihood that information disseminated by a corporation is being relied upon by the stock trading public." 7 3. Number of market makers: "Market makers, who provide a market for securities, are presumably knowledgeable about the issuing company and the stock's supply and demand conditions. Therefore, it is believed the larger the number of market makers in a given security, the more information is available about it and the quicker its dissemination in price." 4. Eligibility to file S-3 Registration Statement: The SEC permits filing of an S-3 Registration Statement "only on the premise that the stock is already traded on an open and efficient market, such that further disclosure is unnecessary."
. Reaction of the stock price to unexpected news events: "Evidence of a causal relationship between unexpected corporate events or financial releases and an immediate response in the stock price is an important indicator of market efficiency."
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Clearly the joint hypothesis problem prevents any such methodology from proving market efficiency absolutely. However, the fraud-on-the-market theory requires "specific guidelines to determine whether a given security was efficiently traded at a point in time."
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The focus must then be shifted from "fundamental" market efficiency to "relative" market efficiency.
The main hurdle facing the methodology is the determination of the minimum factor values ("cutoff values") consistent with relative efficiency. Though the Cammer court gives a loose cutoff value for the stock's average trading volume, it left the other four factors unquantified. For instance, should the cutoff for the number of market makers be 2 or 20? Does one day, two days, or a week count as an immediate price response to new information?
Since the Cammer methodology was first introduced in 1989, courts have modified it by adding other factors, which are thought to be better indicators of relative stock market efficiency, and by removing emphasis from other apparently less indicative factors. The biggest update came from ONeil v. Appel (1996) , 13 which introduced firm size, bid-ask spread, and float to the list, and questioned the validity of using the number of market makers as an indicator. Though these new factors have certain intuitive and academic support, they still run into the same problems of ambiguity regarding cutoff values. Additional ambiguity in the methodology is introduced from the fact that courts place unequal weightings on various factors. For instance, citing ONeil and In re 2TheMart.com, Inc (2000) , which "holds that the fifth Cammer factor may be the most significant in determining market efficiency," 14 the court in Krogman v. Sterritt (2001) places less weight on the number of market makers than it does on the reaction of stock price to unexpected news events when making its decision to deny class certification.
There is no theoretical way to determine either weights or cutoff values, of course. As an empirical matter, the only way to estimate cutoff values is to define what relatively efficient stocks look like, and then to gauge the minimum values consistent with the definition. For instance, establish cutoff values for trade volume and analyst following by calculating the minimum value of each variable which leads their multivariate logit model to result in the prediction of relative market efficiency. Specifically, they define a relatively efficient stock as one which experiences abnormal returns outside the median quintile of abnormal returns in response to an earnings surprise in the extreme quintile of all firms' unexpected earnings surprises. However, this is itself just another ad hoc definition. Different definitions lead to different imputed cutoff values.
Nonetheless, courts have to define relative stock market efficiency somehow. Though it is rarely stated explicitly, whenever a court makes a class certification ruling, it implicitly defines relative stock market efficiency based on which factors weigh on its decision. For instance, some courts may weigh most heavily on trade volume and analyst following (implicitly defining relative stock market efficiency in manner similar to ). As mentioned above, many courts weigh quick price reaction to unexpected news events (usually demonstrated via an event study of stock price reaction to management's admission of material factual misstatements or omissions) as the most important indicator of relative stock market efficiency. Over time, a body of case law has converged towards a set of applicable Cammer weights and cutoffs, or at least narrowed the plausible range of values.
This workable state of affairs has radically changed with the advent of 10b-5 cases involving non-equity markets. When the security in question is a bond, a derivative, or any other corporate obligation, the check-list of factors proposed by the Cammer court (and augmented in O'Neil) may be impossible to verify or logically inapplicable:
• Average daily trading volume is not recorded for most bonds and derivatives, which are not traded on an exchange, and for which there is no obligation to report this information to any public body.
• While, for some bonds, credit rating agencies may play an analogous role to equity analysts, in Krogman v. Sterritt (2001) the court found that "coverage by Moody's and similar publications is insufficient to weigh in favor of market efficiency." Many classes of derivatives (for instance, options) are not rated.
• The number of market makers is, like volume, an uncollected statistic. Indeed, not all markets even have official market makers, working instead by public submission of orders or bilateral bargaining.
• While some securities are registered with the SEC, there is no specific filing comparable to the S-3 statement for stocks.
• Bid/ask spreads are again not tabulated in most over-the-counter markets. Individual dealers may record their spreads, but not necessarily those of their competitors.
• Total market value of a security may be roughly comparable to firm size or float. However for many derivatives, such as swaps or forward contracts, current market value may be unrelated to the potential size of future cash-flows.
At present, no legal standards exist for assessing efficiency in non-equity markets. It should be noted that the lack of transparency and disclosure in credit and derivatives markets does not itself imply any inefficiency. While there may be no public record of tight markets, high volume, or quick reactions, there is every reason to suppose that the professionals who trade or monitor these securities have just as much incentive as stock market participants to value them accurately.
To conclude, while there is still some ambiguity surrounding the assessment of stock market efficiency in the context of securities litigation, the fact that the Cammer methodology has stood the test of time points favorably to its ability to convey relevant information to the court. There have been literally hundreds of cases since 1989, each one of which has debated the pros and cons of the methodology. Yet each has been forced to adopt some variant of Cammer. Despite the additional practical difficulties that arise with derivatives, ultimately some similar workable test is needed.
Efficiency in Contingent Claims Markets
As discussed above, the practical difficulties of assessing efficiency in contingent claims (or derivatives) markets are even greater than for stocks. Moreover, the theoretical picture is even more complex. To start with, the efficiency of a contingent claims price may be dependent on that of the underlying securities, which would then still need to be decided. Not only that, determining the precise relationship between the two -the correct derivatives pricing model -would also seem to be necessary, adding a further layer of ambiguity.
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In this section, we tackle these problems. We propose a definition of efficiency of a derivatives market which is straightforward to assess via a workable test. We establish some strong theoretical properties for our test, and illustrate them through a numerical example. Most compellingly, the test is immune both to the problem of determining efficiency of the underlying primary securities, and to the additional problem of specifying the correct derivatives pricing model. We also highlight the main potential difficulties that we envision arising in applications, and suggest what to do about them.
Definitions and Tests.
To start, let us define what we mean by a derivative. Theoretically, a derivative is a security whose cashflows are perfectly replicable by some, possibly dynamic, portfolio of other securities. This definition is difficult to verify in all but a few simple cases. We will instead, adopt the following more pragmatic definition.
Definition 4.1 A security will be called a derivative if the cashflows to which it is a claim (or obligation) can be described by some function C(U t , t) where U t is a vector of time-t prices of some set U of underlying assets.
An ordinary call option on a stock meets this definition, for example, since, on exercise the holder receives value max[S t − K, 0] where K is the strike price and S t is the price of the stock. The same call, if owned by an employee of the company on which it is written and who forfeits it if she quits, is not a derivative under this definition because the state of being employed/not-employed is not itself the price of any asset. Likewise an option on a non-traded underlying index (e.g. a weather derivative) will not meet this definition unless there is some other contract also written on the same index which can be taken as an underlying asset. This example illustrates that the set of assets that can be viewed as derivatives expands when a larger menu of primary securities is available. At the same time, it shows that not every complicated contract can be brought within the scope of our definition.
The economic notion of a derivative as a redundant asset has the powerful implication that its price must be equal to the value of the portfolio that replicates it, or else there is an arbitrage opportunity, which cannot occur in equilibrium. So it is tempting to equate the efficiency of a derivatives market with the absence of arbitrage, and then simply check whether market prices equal their no-arbitrage values.
Again, however, this is impractical since the theoretical models almost always depend on strong (and, in practice, false) assumptions, both about perfect market conditions and about the driving stochastic processes in the economy. Thus, like the CAPM, they can easily be rejected using data on markets that otherwise seem efficient in a qualitative sense. It would seem implausible to contend, for example, that a large and liquid derivatives market dominated by attentive professionals -like that of S&P500 index optionsfails to respond to important information. Yet, more than thirty years after Black and Scholes (1973) , there is still no accepted theoretical model which correctly describes the prices of all those options. This is, of course, the joint hypothesis problem all over again.
Our approach to this conundrum is to step back from the models and instead merely define efficiency by the condition that there be some mapping from the prices of the underlying assets to the derivative price, without requiring that it be completely agreed upon.
Definition 4.2 A derivative will be said to be priced efficiently (or, equivalently, the market for it called efficient) if its price is given by some function f (X t , t) where X t is a vector of time-t prices of some set X of traded assets.
At first glance, this definition seems no closer to practicality, without some way to identify the function f ( ). However the key observation is that it is much easier to decide that a given security should only depend on X t than to actually exhibit the complete form of the relationship.
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The following proposition shows the implications of this idea. 16 Note too that the set of assets X determining the price of the derivative need not coincide with the set that we called U dictating its contractual cash-flows.
Note: all proofs appear in the appendix.
The first part of the proposition says that, if it is agreed that the value of a derivative depends on at most a specified set of assets, then efficiency is determined by the condition that Y t immediately reflects changes in the value of those assets: lagged values don't matter. The second part says that, if it is agreed that the value of the derivative must depend at least on a (smaller) set of assets, then we can reject efficiency if any information about them is not immediately incorporated into Y t .
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What we have done here is to combine the commonly understood notion of efficiency -that prices "reflect" all current information -with the defining property of a derivative -its value is determined by other assets -to deduce a criterion that makes no reference to a particular "true" pricing model. The criterion suggests, moreover, that efficiency can be assessed by two straightforward steps.
(1) Agree upon a set V of assets which is unlikely to exclude any important determinant of the derivative's value.
(2) Test whether, controlling for the prices V t of the V assets, the price Y t of the derivative is independent of lagged values of V t .
If not, reject efficiency; otherwise accept. The second step could be implemented by a regression of Y on current and past values of V . Under the null of efficiency, the errors in this regression would represent the difference between the true pricing function f ( ) and the linear projection on V . Since these errors will typically depend on the levels of the variables, they will be highly persistent or even non-stationary. Following standard econometric advice, we then propose the modification:
(2 ) Test whether the changes (or percent changes), ∆Y t , are independent of lagged values of ∆V t , controlling contemporaneous changes and levels of V t .
The condition Y = f (V ) for some f is equivalent to the condition that ∆Y = g(V, ∆V ) for some g(). So (2) and (2 ) are logically identical. If the level of V does not vary much over the time span of the data, or the true function f is close to linear, the extra level controls can be dispensed with, leading to:
(2 ) Test whether ∆Y t is independent of ∆V t−k , (for some set of k > 0) controlling for ∆V t .
In this form, the test is simply a measurement of cross serial correlation. In either form (2 ) or (2 ) it would be implemented by standard t or F tests. Test of this form have been used by (among others) Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) and Hou and Moskowitz (2005) to judge reaction speeds of some assets to information flows in other assets. There is nothing new in this. Our contribution is just to observe that, in the context of derivatives markets, the outcome of such a test implies a verdict on market efficiency that does not require a priori acceptance of a particular true pricing model -for either the derivative or the underlying assets.
Robustness Properties.
The model-free nature of the test outlined above invites some further questions about its expected performance. While it does not require specification of true pricing models, this does not imply that misspecification will not create problems. In this subsection we seek to establish that the test can indeed work as designed. Our approach here is theoretical; the next subsection will make the same points in the context of a simulation exercise.
To The proposition formally establishes the consistency of our testing procedure. It shows that -in the limit -an ordinary regression in differences will detect inefficiency (as we have defined it) when and only when it is present, even though the true pricing model is not assumed to be linear. Note that the proposition makes no claims about the ability to estimate that true pricing function, or even the true sensitivities β X . Fortunately, these do not affect the determination of efficiency.
. , T }. Let I be any subset of indices (possibly repeated) of components of X and let {k i } i∈I denote a corresponding set of positive multiples of h. Denote by Z t the vector of lagged components [X
(i) t−k i ] i∈I and put V t = [X t ; Z t ].
Consider the regression of {∆ log Y t } t∈τ h on {∆ log V t } t∈τ h yielding the regression co-
efficientβ h = [β X h ;β Z h ].
(i) Suppose the derivative is priced efficiently, and that Y t = f (X t ; t). Then

(ii) Suppose the derivative is priced inefficiently and that
Y t = f (X t , Z
Corollary 4.1 The results of the proposition hold whether or not the underlying asset prices are themselves efficient.
The corollary is the second of our robustness results. It shows the sense in which we have by-passed the joint hypothesis problem of Section 2. Our test results will be the same (at least in the limit) however expected returns in the economy are determined. It may be objected that we have not defined what we mean by market efficiency for the underlying assets. Technically, the statement would be phrased in terms of whether or not the expected returns, µ t , are supported in any rational expectations equilibrium. But the point of the result is that we need not be concerned with verifying such a condition.
The result is fortuitous in as much as one might well expect that if X were inefficient, there would be no way to identify separately efficient or inefficient price patterns in Y . If Y simply inherited X's inefficiency, any rejection of efficiency for Y could be due to X. But this is not so. Intuitively, even if lags of ∆X predict future ∆X, they will not predict future ∆Y given ∆X, unless there is a distinct failure of Y to adjust immediately to X.
The above conclusions, while providing a theoretical foundation for our test, are still theoretical. It is important to assess their validity in finite samples of the kind likely to be encountered in practice. We now illustrate the robustness properties developed here in a concrete example.
A Numerical Example.
Suppose we are interested in assessing the efficiency of the market for a corporate bond. Corporate bonds are derivatives if their bankruptcy risk is hedgeable, which it may be if other claims to the firm's assets are traded. In the context of the canonical Merton (1974) model, these assets are assumed to be directly available, and the payoff of a zero-coupon bond maturing at T is the lesser of the face value, K, of the debt or the asset value, V T .
We consider the case of an investigator who has access to daily prices of such a bond, and of V .
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As above, let Y represent the price of the derivative (the bond). The underlying economy is assumed to evolve in continuous time; the interest rate is constant; and the price V evolves according to the diffusion
where σ is constant and B is a standard Brownian Motion. We consider the four cases described in Table 1 . The goals are to show, first, that misspecification does not lead to overrejection (cases I and III), and, second, that the power to detect inefficiency of Y (cases II and IV) is high, and not diminished by the possible inefficiency of V . 
The table describes the scenarios for four simulation cases. In each, the derivative price is given by the function f ( ) of the Merton (1974) model. In the inefficient cases, denotes a trailing moving average as described in the text. All cases set r = 0.04, T = 5, V 0 = K = 100, σ = 0.20. The simulation frequency is daily. Each cases consists of 10,000 simulated paths.
To complete the specification, we need to explain our parameterization of efficiency and inefficiency for the two markets. The base case, Scenario I, will be taken to be as described by the Merton (1974) model. Specifically, we set r = 0.04, T = 5, V 0 = K = 100, σ = 0.20, and µ = 0.10, and take Y t = f (V t , t) to be the no-arbitrage price
where N is the cumulative normal distribution function and
The same function is used in scenario III.
When the market for Y is assumed inefficient, we suppose that, while the bond price is given by the same functional form, the bond market reacts slowly to V as in Y t = f (V t , t) whereV t is a moving average of V t and its recent lags. Letting
for some weighting vector a. We report values for k = 2 and a = [0.90, 0.08, 0.02], which is meant to describe a market that is close to efficient, in the sense that 98% of all relevant information is incorporated in Y within two days, and all of it within three.
To parameterize inefficiency for V , we describe a process with a high degree of longlived predictability. Specifically, we set µ t = −b L k ∆v t where b is a positive weighting vector and L k ∆v t is a vector of lagged percent changes in V . This makes the returns to V mean reverting: past changes from t − k to t translate into deterministic changes of the opposite sign. We set k = 125 and b i = 2/125 for all i, which means that the previous six month's returns are expected to reverse over roughly the next three months. We do not know whether such a process is inefficient in the purest sense: possibly it is supportable by some equilibrium economy. For present purposes, what matters is that it captures the kind of dynamic whose confounding effects on our test we might worry about. Table 2 shows the rejection rates of standard F tests of the hypothesis that none of the first three lags of ∆V affect ∆Y . We report both ordinary OLS test statistics, as well as those based on the White (1980) covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients, which corrects for heteroscedasticity induced by misspecification. In addition, the table shows results for both the simple regression in changes (test (2 ) above) and for a specification controlling for the level of V t i in the contemporaneous response of ∆Y to ∆V (i.e. a version of test (2 )).
The results show that all versions of the test perform almost exactly as standard sampling theory would lead us to expect when the null of efficiency is true. In cases I and III, the true null is rejected as often as it should be given the nominal critical value of the F statistic. Cases II and IV show that both OLS and White (1980) versions of the test achieve good power in detecting inefficiency when it is present in the derivative prices. When the level correction terms are included in the specification, the power becomes exceptional. Comparing cases III and IV, neither the power nor the size of the test is much affected by the presence of inefficiency in the underlying asset.
We have repeated this exercise with a variety of parameter values and found results consistently similar to those reported here. This is still a simulation however, and the findings do not necessarily imply that the test would be similarly successful under any other set of conditions. But it does give us confidence that the theoretical properties we established are not merely theoretical. They may describe the expected performance observed in finite samples of discretely sampled data. The table shows rejection frequencies for the test of the null of efficient derivative prices in 10,000 simulations of the data generating processes described in the text. The cases are as specified in 1. The tests are F tests for the coefficients on three lags of the return on the underlying asset being jointly zero in a regression of derivative returns. Critical values for the F statistic correspond to the percentiles shown in the second column. Test (2 ) includes only contemporaneous underlying returns on the right hand side (in addition to the lags). Test (2 ) also includes an interaction term of the underlying price level with its contemporaneous changes to control for nonlinearity. The F tests are conducted using both the standard OLS estimator of the covariance of the estimated coefficients as well as the White (1980) estimator which corrects for heteroscedasticity in the residuals.
Implementation Issues.
Before turning to an application of the test in a real problem, it is worthwhile to consider what could still go wrong. There are a few potential shortcomings we can envision. And, in implementing any statistical methodology, it is important to face up to these in advance so as to be able to assess their likelihood of affecting the results in the situation at hand. We discuss four problems in (roughly) increasing order of severity, and offer suggestions for dealing with them.
Specification searches. Our test does not specify every detail of the actual computation to be performed. The number of lags of the independent variables, the sampling interval, and the critical values of the F statistic were all left open. There is a potential danger here if these are not determined before examining the data. If the investigator is free to assess multiple versions of the test, the probabilistic interpretation of the one actually reported is distorted. Unfortunately, if a test using two lags of weekly data with a 90% critical value rejects, it does not follow that another using five daily lags and a 99% confidence level will also reject. Since plausible arguments can always be advanced ex post to justify any one set of choices, the only way to guard against result mining is to decide the issue in advance. Since it may perhaps help to arbitrate, we suggest that three lags of daily data with a 95% critical value should be regarded as generally appropriate.
Extreme nonlinearity. While we have emphasized that our test does not require specification of the correct model relating derivative prices to the prices of the underlying assets, this does not mean that better specifications wouldn't improve its performance. In our framework, the regression residuals are equal to the specification errors, so diminishing the residuals decreases the standard errors of the coefficient estimates, which increases the power of the test to detect inefficiency. This is what happened in our example above when we included a level-dependent correction term. This can be interpreted as having approximated the true marginal response (or "delta" in market parlance) by a first-order Taylor series expansion in powers of the underlying asset. In principle, still higher order terms could improve performance still further. Perhaps more useful would be the use of a parametric model for the marginal response, which, even if imperfect may dramatically improve the fit. For example, the Black and Scholes (1973) model suggests a functional form for the elasticity in an options pricing regression.
experience sustained trends or sequences of returns in the same direction. In that case, misspecification of the correct marginal response will lead to strong autocorrelation in the residuals, which the regression will attempt to "fix" by utilizing the information in lags of the independent variable. Again, robust standard errors can help to avoid a false finding of inefficiency stemming from this effect.
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Omitted variables. Proposition 2 demonstrated that the investigator need not be certain of having included every relevant underlying variable in order to reach a verdict of inefficiency. One stipulation was required for this result however: if there are any omitted variables that have an independent influence on changes in Y , we need to be certain that these do not covary with lags of the included variables, after controlling for any contemporaneous covariance. Suppose the volatility of stock changes over the life of an option written on it. If we fail to control for this in assessing the option's dynamics,
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we might falsely detect inefficient dependence of ∆Y on lags of the stock changes ∆S if those lagged changes -in addition to contemporaneous changes -influence current volatility.
On the other hand, there is a corresponding danger of failing to detect true inefficiency by omitting important variables: the test can't find a lagged response to a variable that isn't in the regression.
The regression R 2 provides a practical means of detecting omitted variables in our context. Again, a key fact about derivatives is that, given the true functional form of the pricing model, all variation would be explained. An R 2 below 50% may indicate that the set of explanatory variables may need to be expanded.
Bad prices. Many derivatives trade in markets that are decentralized, and no official record of transactions exists. Others that are listed on exchanges are often sparsely traded, and recorded quotes may be out of date or unrepresentative. For our test, the danger is that bad recorded prices can give the appearance of an inefficient market, even when true tradeable prices do reflect current information. One way this can happen is if a random error is added (e.g. through noisy sampling) to recorded prices, which then shows up as a mean-reverting component in returns, which may look like short-term overreaction. The opposite effect occurs when stale quotes are used: markets appear to lag actual information.
It may be extremely difficult to distinguish these spurious patterns from true inefficiency. However, here again, the problem is less severe for derivatives than for primary securities. The reason is that we are not equating inefficiency with dependence on own lags, but on lags of the determining variables. To the extent that sampling errors are idiosyncratic, they will not necessarily induce lagged dependence on the other regressors.
The potential severity of sampling error can be assessed, and its effects mitigated, by including lags of the derivative returns themselves in the regression. In effect, this applies a filter to the dependent variable, and sharpens the ability to measure true dependence on lagged exogenous information. Use of autocorrelation-robust standard errors is also appropriate where lagged dependence is detected in the residuals.
With these four caveats in mind, we now turn to the application of our test to a significant legal problem, where a large amount of money may depend on the outcome.
Application
Section 3 described the importance of determining market efficiency in class action securities fraud litigation, and summarized the development and use of the Cammer criteria. In Section 4 we proposed a test that seeks to generalize the one criterion -reaction speed to relevant news -that is still unequivocally relevant in the context of derivatives. We now demonstrate the applicability of our methodology to a specific case.
The case we have in mind concerns the issuance by Citigroup (and others) of creditlinked notes in 1999, whose principal repayment was contingent on the non-occurrence of certain pre-defined "credit-events" (e.g. bankruptcy or lesser forms of financial distress) for a "reference entity" -which was Enron. Claimant purchasers of the notes are seeking damages based on Citigroup's alleged fraudulent sale at prices it knew to be inflated. As in other 10b-5 cases, the courts have required a determination of the efficiency of the market for the notes as a prerequisite for certification of the class.
The notes in question, called Yosemite Securities Trust Series I 8.25%s of 11/15/04, were issued in November 1999 and had face value of $750 million. They were sold both in the U.S. (as a Rule-144a private placement) and overseas. They were rated, and were fairly widely held and traded. (As with most OTC securities, however, no reliable statistics on secondary market activity exist.) They led a quiet life until the final six weeks preceding Enron's collapse at the end of November 2001. (See Figure 1. )
In applying our methodology, the first step is to decide what the Yosemite notes were derivatives of, that is, what other assets should have determined their value. Clearly, since the cash-flows hinged on the credit status of Enron, the value of the notes depended crucially on the net worth of that firm. While we could, in principle, choose any obligation of Enron to proxy for the company's health, the natural choice in terms of data quality is to use the stock price. Next, by the same logic, since the fulfillment of all obligations relating to the debt depend on the credit of Citigroup, we view Citigroup's stock as a second underlying asset. Of course, ex post Citigroup's health never affected the cashflows. But ex ante it might have. Finally, we view the notes as also depending on the prices of government bonds of a similar maturity. While there is no contractual connection between the two, clearly the term structure of interest rates is an important input into the valuation of the note's promised cash-flows. Hence we include an index of intermediate maturity Treasury bonds (specifically, the Lehman Brothers 3-5 year composite index) in our list of underlying assets.
To be clear, then, our operational hypothesis is that the market for the Yosemite notes should be deemed inefficient if prices for it fail to respond instantly to changes in the values of the above set of primary assets. Conversely, if there is no discernible dependency at any plausible lag (we use up to three days), then efficiency should not be rejected.
Before proceeding to the results, some discussion of the data situation is necessary. We have already emphasized that reliable, public market statistics about trading volume and spreads are unavailable. However, some market participants do attempt to keep track of prices on a regular basis. While the most accurate records undoubtedly belong to dealers and active traders, these are proprietary and unavailable to us. A second best alternative is the prices compiled by the major quotation vendors. We obtained three distinct series from Datastream, Factiva, and Reuters.
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All these firms (or their suppliers) claim to base their prices on expert assessment of current market conditions. In practice, their ability to poll dealers is limited and they often rely on guesswork or mechanical assessment.
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Recalling the discussion in the last section, noisy prices do not themselves invalidate our methodology since they need not affect the lagged dependence on other assets. However, to be safe, we apply all our tests separately to each series and also attempt to measure and control for the noise component of each.
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After the middle of October 2001 there is a sharp change, not only in the value, but also in the dynamic properties of the Yosemite notes. Prior to this, the relationship with Enron's stock price was muted, as bankruptcy was never much of a possibility. Once bad news accumulated to a certain point, by contrast, Enron's net worth became the major determinant of value. This realization points to possible complications in modeling the correct form of the dependence. Unfortunately (for us) the class period for the litigation extends to November 27, 2001, forcing us to confront the specification issues. Nevertheless, to set the stage, Table 3 shows the results of running the simple linear version of our test on the data up to October 15, 2001. For all of the data series, the responses of the Yosemite prices to lagged information is statistically insignificant the 95% level. Based on the diagnostics shown, the Reuters series appears reliable, while the other two show evidence of residual autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity or both. Given the high explanatory power (adjusted R percent) achieved by the linear specification for the Reuters series, the lower R 2 and worse heteroskedsticity exhibited by the other two suggests noisy sampling rather than misspecification. Despite this, when using appropriately robust inference, our test finds no evidence of inefficiency in this period.
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The bonds appear to respond strongly to current interest rate and credit information, and, especially for the Reuters series, seem free of other extraneous influences. These findings create a strong presumption of an efficiently functioning market.
Since the legal question at issue requires treatment of the full class period, we now extend the analysis through November 2001. As noted, the linear model applicable to the pre-crash period is likely to be grossly misspecified after the middle of October. While our earlier numerical exercise did lend us confidence that ordinary misspecification would not translate into spurious test results, the danger in the present situation is that the misspecification coincides with a period of strong positive realized autocorrelation. Because Enron (and our bonds) declined precipitously for several weeks in a row, if the regression underestimates the full contemporaneous response to Enron news (as it will, since the full-sample average response was much lower), lags of Enron's return will seem to provide additional information (since they go in the same direction).
We noted this danger briefly in Section 4. To demonstrate, we used the actual Enron price series to value a hypothetical security and ran our tests on it. The theoretical bond was priced efficiently by construction: the underlying prices were mapped immediately into bond prices by a version of Merton's (1974) model. Yet, even using robust standard errors, the linear version of our test rejects efficiency at the 99 percent level with this particular realization of the stock.
The solution to this problem is to improve the marginal response model so that the regression is not forced to use an average response during a period in which conditions were anything but average. Accordingly we adopt two nonlinear specifications. First we use a version of the test (2 ) suggested above which includes a price level term in the specification of the response to Enron's price changes. Second, we employ a threshold response model, which allows the coefficient on Enron's price change to switch when the stock declines below its level in mid-October. Table 5 shows the outcome of our efficiency test using these augmented models.
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Again the results support the supposition of efficiency. For none of the specifications or versions of the test is there any evidence of lagged response to the information in Enron's stock price or the other underlying variables. Instead, the results are consistent 25 The corresponding OLS test statistic for the Datastream series does reject. However, on inspection, the rejection is due to an estimated negative association between the Yosemite prices and the lagged return to Citigroup stock. Given that no such response turns up in the other series, and given that it makes no sense economically for positive information about the obligor to affect the debt price negatively, and given the evidence for heteroscedasticity, we are comfortable upholding the verdict of no inefficiency.
26 We also tried specifications in which explicit proxies for bankruptcy probability were used. The results were consistent with those reported in the table below. with a market that responded every bit as rapidly to the accumulating negative news as did the stock market. Here it is worthwhile to recall, as well, that our test makes no presumption that the underlying stock itself was priced efficiently. Our stance is that the efficiency of the derivative should be gauged by its response to the values of the other securities upon which it depends. It is this quality that the tests measure. On this basis, the evidence suggests the Yosemite notes were indeed priced efficiently during the sample period.
Conclusion
Today many, if not most, financial economists consider that the paradigm of market efficiency either is undecidable or has been rejected. Nonetheless, in the legal realm, the concept has acquired pivotal status in many settings, and thus must be decided one way or the other on a case-by-case basis. We consider the problem in the context of securities fraud litigation involving derivatives and other non-equity claims. We argue that, for this class of securities, a workable definition of efficiency exists that sidesteps the problem of determining the "true" model of expected returns. Indeed, our definition does not even require specification of the correct derivatives pricing model. The definition has a natural interpretation in terms of a time-series regression, which, in turn, suggests a straightforward efficiency test. We show, both theoretically and by simulations, that this test has strong robustness properties, in the sense that it gives the right answer even when the regression itself is misspecified. We consider some subtleties that arise in practice, and offer some guidelines for dealing with them. We apply the test to an important real example, and reach a clear verdict.
The implication on our results is that for a broad and growing class of financial claims, efficiency as a concept need not be abandoned as a useful tool for deciding legal and regulatory questions.
A Proofs
This appendix provides proofs of the results in Section 3. To start, we give a lemma which characterizes conditions under which a given random variable does not affect the conditional expectation of another.
Proposition A.1 Let X, Y, and Z denote three random variables defined on a common probability space (Ω, F, P ). Assume that the conditional expectations E(Y |X, Z) and E(Y |X) exist.
is that Y and Z are conditionally independent given X.
Proof. To prove (i), we evaluate the conditional covariance
So if Z drops out of the conditional expectation of Y given X, then the first term in square brackets is zero, hence the conditional covariance is zero, which is the result claimed.
For (ii), we will establish that E(Y |X) is (a version of) E(Y |X, Z). The former is clearly measurable with respect to σ(X, Z). Moreover since that algebra is generated by sets of the form {X ∈ B 1 } ∩ {Z ∈ B 2 }, it suffices to show that
for any Borel sets B 1 and B 2 . So evaluate the latter expectation by first conditioning on X. 27 Here and in the text, conditioning on a collection of random variables should be understood as conditioning on the σ-algebra generated by them.
If Y and Z are conditionally independent given X, then
So the last line above can be written
which is the required condition.
QED
We now turn to the proposition in the text. (ii) Suppose the derivative is priced inefficiently and that Y t = f (X t , Z 
Proof.
The proposition implicitly assumes that all processes are defined on a complete filtered probability space (Ω, F t , P ), and that µ t and Σ t satisfy regularity conditions sufficient for the existence of the solution to the SDE defining the process X. In addition, the function f ( ) giving the price of Y is assumed to have two continuous partial derivatives in its process arguments, and one continuous partial time derivative.
Let dy and dv denote the discretely sampled percentage change processes of Y and U . The regression coefficient β from the regression of dy on dv may be written where n = 1 + T /h, the number of observations. Both parts of the proposition concern the limits of the second term: the sample cross moment vector. By definition, this second moment sum converges to the cross quadratic variation of the processes y ≡ log(Y ) and v ≡ log(V ), denoted T 0 [dy, dv] . As is well known, for any two diffusion processes, X 1 and X 2 , having Itô representations dX 1 = µ 1 dt+Σ 1 dB and dX 2 = µ 2 dt+Σ 2 dB, the cross variation process is just where the second row collects the components of X whose lagged values make up V . The key point is that, since Brownian increments are independent across time, the cross-variation terms in the covariance matrix are zero.
In part (i) of the proposition, the process y has a diffusion term given (from Itô's lemma) by So the cross variation of dy with the lagged terms of du is zero. Hence the limiting regression coefficient is as well.
In (ii), on the other hand, the assumption of lagged dependence implies that the diffusion term of dy is of the form The corollary to the proposition follows from the fact that no reference is made in the above argument for how the expected returns on the underlying assets are determined. In particular, the vector µ X can depend on lagged information, on market sentiment, or anything else. Of course, the corollary does continue to assume the price process X t has the form of a diffusion, as in the proposition.
